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selves. The overarching concern is that the expense of litigation and
potential for extremely high awards of damages serve as strong incentive
for named defendants to accept settlement letters, irrespective of their
.
231
gm·1t or mnocence.
In one of the only file sharing cases to proceed to
litigation, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a $1,920,000 verdict
re~dered against a defendant who shared twenty-four copyrighted songs
usmg a P2P network, subsequently remitted to $54,000. 232
.Giv~n the incentive to settle, once defendants' identifying informat10n 1s released to the copyright holders, the settlement letters are
served and defendants overwhelmingly choose to accept the offers. 233
~llowin~ d~scovery of defendants' identifying information and deferring
issues ofJomder and personal jurisdiction deprives defendants of an opportunity to dispute these matters. 234 Findingjoinder of defendants improper helps to prevent copyright holders' goals of mass settlements and
accords with previous P2P file sharing cases. 235

NOTE OF THE YEAR
IS WIKILEAKS A HIT MAN
HANDBOOK?:
WHY WIKILEAKS CANNOT CLAIM
FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IF
THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WAR LOGS
CAUSE PHYSICAL HARM
Rachel Wolbers*
"President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open
government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not only the cause of hu1
man rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. "
INTRODUCTION

.
230 cr
P ep1tone,
.
0ee Ju 1ianne
50,000 BitTorrent Users Suedfor Alleged Illegal
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011),
~ttp:/'.money.cnn.com/2011/06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (collect1~g vte~s. of ~ritics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and refernng to litigation as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method).
231
See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (indicating that file-sharers' lawsuits
typi~ally proceed no further than the release of the defendants' identifying informat10n and subsequent distribution of settlement letters); see supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text.
·
232
.
680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (remitting damages rendered
agamst P2P file-sharer to $2250 per infringed work, three times the statutory minimum).
233 0ee
cr n·1ckman, supra note 23, at 1111 (2008) (indicating that file sharers
law~uits typically proceed no further than release of defendants' identifying information and subsequent distribution of settlement letters).
234 0ee l'd. (assertmg
. that courts may never resolve procedural questions since
defendants were unlikely to proceed to trial).
235
See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of why joinder should be found improper.

On July 25, 2010 WikiLeaks.org ("WikiLeaks") released almost
70,000 classified U.S. military documents on to its website, detailing
2
American operations in Afghanistan (the "Afghan War Logs").
While the Afghan War Logs comprised only a small portion of the
documents released on WikiLeaks during 2010, this leak alone con3
tained the names and addresses of over 117 informants. A hypothetical cable from the Afghan War Logs would read:
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, awarded Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet Note of the Year, as selected by the Volume 2 Editorial Board.
1 Press Release, White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, Nov. 28,
2010, at http ://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11 /28/statement-press-secretary.
2
C.J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive and an Unvarnished Look at a Hamstrung Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at Al.
3
Larry Love, Here are the Details o/Wikileaks Informants, ABOVE TOP
SECRET (Jun. 30, 2010, 2:08 PM),
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread598661/pgl.
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"HCT4 was notified by local informant Rachel Redacted of
IEDs 6 hidden in a plum orchard in Khost. Orchard belonged
to Paul Property-Owner, 7 but he was not currently living in
area. Rachel Redacted has provided information on IEDs at
least 15 times in the past. Counter-IED Units located all IED
8
components buried in plum orchard."
From this cable, Rachel Redacted's identity could easily be discovered with the help of some local knowledge. 9 Providing clues regarding the specific identities of U.S. collaborators put these- inform10
ants, their families, and the U.S. troops in the region in harm's way.
Shortly after the Afghan War Logs release, the New York Times reported that the Taliban formed a nine-member commission to create a
11
"wanted" list of Afghan informants identified on WikiLeaks. The
Taliban spokesman added, "[a]fter the process is completed, our Taliban court will decide about such people." 12 A Taliban "court" would
13
likely sentence suspected informants to a gruesome death.
4
HCT stands for "Human Intelligence Collection Team." U.S. DEP'T OF
ARMY, Field Manual No. 2-22.3 (34-52), Human Intelligence Collector Operations
(Sept. 6, 2006) at Glossary 5, available at:
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23167-1/FM/222.3/gloss.htm.
5
Rachel Redacted is a hypothetical informant. I will reference her through
this note instead of referring to the actual informants listed in the Afghan and Iraq
War Logs.
6
JED stands for "Improvised Explosive Device." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FMI
3-34.119, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (Sept., 2005) at Chapter 1; U.S.
MARINE CORPS, MCIP 3-17.01, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (Sept., 2005) at
Chapter 1, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf.
7
.
As with the hypothetical informant, I have further redacted the specific
owner of the orchard to Paul Property-Owner.
8
This hypothetical is based closely on an actual cable released on WikiLeaks. To protect the individuals referenced in the actual cable, this Note uses a
hypothetical.
9
DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, THE GUARDIAN, Wn<ILEAK.S: INSIDE
JULIANASSANGE'SWARONSECRECY 112 (2011) [hereinafter LEIGH] ("[I]twas [clearly] possible to work out identities of informants with the help of some local
knowledge, and to publish the log might lead to the Taliban executing ... Afghans.").
10
Id. at 111 ("[We were] worried about the repercussions of publishing these
names, who could easily be killed by the Taliban or other militant groups if identified.").
11
John F. Bums & Ravi Somaiya, Wikileaks Founder on the Run, Trailed by
Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 15 [hereinafter Bums & Somaiya]
12
Id. at Al.
13
Alissa J. Rubin, Expanding Control, Taliban Refresh Stamp on Afghan
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A4 [hereinafter Rubin] (quoting Hajji Maitullah
Khan "Taliban are very harsh to those who have been convicted of spying and those
who have an affiliation with the government and the foreigners .... People convicted
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***

On the night of March 3, 1993, James Perry, a contract killer,
murdered Mildred Hom, her quadriplegic son, Trevor, and Trevor's
nurse, Janice Saunders. 14 Lawrence Hom, ex-husband of Mildred and
father to Trevor, hired Perry to kill the family so he could inherit Trevor's trust fund. 15 In plotting the murders, Perry followed, step-bystep, the instructions of the book Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors ("Hit Man Handbook"), published by Paladin Press ("Paladin"). 16 The victims' families sued Paladin for wrongful death on the theory that Paladin had aided and abetted the murders
17
by supplying Perry the training manual. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for trial, holding that the First Amendment did not prevent
subjecting the publisher, Paladin, to liability for the wrongful deaths
18
of the victims' families.

***

19

Will the Free Speech Clause of The First Amendment protect
WikiLeaks or, like Paladin, could WikiLeaks be subject to liability if
its publication of the Afghan and Iraq War Logs led to the unlawful
killing of a U.S. informant or soldier? Both publications add discourse
to the public debate on issues of criminal activity. Although the vast
majority of readers will use these publications in a non-violent way2°,
both publications can facilitate crime by providing information that
makes it easier for someone to commit a crime. While the judicial

of such crimes can be beaten up severely.... One man ... was given 500 lashes a
day for several days.").
14 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-42 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
ls Id.
16
Id. at 242.
17
Id. at 243.
18 Id. at 233 (4th Cir. 1997). See Publisher Settles Case Over Killing Manual,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at A27 (reporting that Hit Man publisher Paladin settled
the lawsuit by agreeing to stop publishing and selling the manual, as well as paying
the victims' families millions of dollars).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .. _."). The First Amendment can serve as a defense in both criminal and civil cases. See generally, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, (2011) (Defendants protesting at Iraqi War Veteran funerals were given immunity from civil liability
for the tort oflntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under the First Amendment.).
20 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, at
1123 n.117 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh] ("In 1983, when Hit Man was published,
there were only about 20,000 homicides in the U.S ..... It seems likely that very few
of them are contract killings, and presumably very few of those are contract killings
by people trained using a particular book.").
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system must protect freedom of speech, it must also ensure safety to
those assisting the U.S. in its war efforts.
The unredacted WikiLeaks cables are damaging to both the U.S.
informants listed and the overall U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and
21
!1"aq. _The Bill of Rights is designed to balance competing interests,
mclud~g pers?nal liberty, individual safety, and national security. 22
A wartime envrronment, however, inevitably intensifies this tension. 23
Throughout American history, the government has restricted public
discourse in the name of "national security." 24 Nevertheless, even in
~he ~ame_ of national se~~ty the ~overnment must have a compelling
25
Justification for such llilllts. Ultrmately, the balancing test for the
freedom of speech is simple: do the benefits of disclosure outweigh its
costs? 26
When addressing the individual safety of those informants exposed by WikiLeaks, the First Amendment offers protection because
it_ "does not guarantee an absolute right to anyone, to express their
views any place, at any time, and in any way they want. " 27 For instance, in order to protect our nation, the government may regulate
spee~h ~hat gives milit~ry advantage to a foreign enemy, 28 or speech
that 1s likely to cause mdividuals to fear immediate violence. 29 Furthermore, speech_ which poses a risk t~ society and that does not promote the underlymg values of the First Amendment can be considered
unprotected speech. 30
21

Press_ Release, White House, Statement of the Press Secretary (Nov. 28,

~? 1O),_ http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/1 I/28/statement-press-secretary

( President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open government at home
and arou~d the world, but thi~ reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal.
By releasmg stol~n and classified d?cuments, WikiLeak:s has put at risk not only the
cause o~~uman nghts but also the hves and work of these individuals.").
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1209.
23
.
E~pionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Serial No. 111-160 Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, I I I th Cong. I I
(2010) (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26
Id. at I3.
27

Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynsk:i, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost ofHarm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM.
& MARYL. REV. 1159, 1179 (2000) (quoting Olivieri v. Ward, 801F.2d602
605 (2d Cir. 1986)).
'
28 J
ENNIFER K. ELSEA, CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF
CLASSIFIED D~FENSE INFORMATION, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R4I404, at 13 n.80 (Sept.
8, 20I I) ~heremafter ELSEA]; See also Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 7I6 (193I).
2 R.A.V. '!· Ci~ of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (I992).
30
See Lon Weiss, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First
Amendment? Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American
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Indeed, the First Amendment protects some speech more than
others. 31 The Supreme Court has held that truthful information 3\hat ~s
a matter of public concern is the most protected type of s~ee~h. This
is justified by the Supreme Court's belief t~at the consti~t10na~ purpose behind the guarantee of press freedom 1s to protect free discussion of governmental affairs." 33 On the other hand, the Com:: has no~
ed that it is "obvious and unarguable" that no govemmental mterest 1s
34
more compelling than the security of the Nation. Therefore, the
court must balance the public concern doctrine, which is ·considered
•
t' s rethe highest rung of protected speech,35 ag~mst
the go_vem:nen36
sponsibility t~ protec! individuals from natl?nal security nsks, _true
threats of violence, 7 and the over-archmg problem of cnme38
facilitating speech.
.
This note will conclude that ifWikiLeaks is prosecuted for cnmes
in relation to the leaked documents, it is not immune from civil or
criminal liability under the First Amendment because the harms created by releasing unredacted documents outweigh the public benefit of
39
added discourse on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Part II disCoalition ofLife Activists Signals the Need to Remed;: an Inadequate J?octrine, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. I283, 1305 (2004) [hereinafter Weiss]; Watts v. Umted States, 394
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
31 ERWIN CHEMERINKSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
93 I (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY] ("The Supren:e
Court has declared that some types of expression are unprotected and may be prohibited and punished.").
32 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 5I4, 527 (200I) (quoting Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)) (restriction of"publication of truthful
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.").
33 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 2I4, 218 (1966).
34 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 3I8 (198I).
35 See Snyderv. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
36

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
See generally Volokh, supra note 20.
39 WikiLeaks could face prosecution:
(1) for wrongful death or torture under the Alien Torts_ ~lain:s ~ct.' 2_8 U.S.C. § ~3?0,
(2006), which reads, "The district courts shall have ongmal JUnsdict10n any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of t?e law _of nat10ns or a
treaty of the United States." This statute is notable for allowmg Umted S~ates cou~s
to hear human rights cases brought by foreign citizens for conduct committed outside
the United States.;
(2) for endangering lives of intelligence personnel under the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 42I-426, (2006), which is a United States federal law that
makes it a federal crime for those with access to classified information, or those who
systematically seek to identify and expose covert agents and hav_e reas_on to believe
that it will harm the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S, to mtent10nally reveal
the identity of an agent whom one knows to be in or recently in certain covert roles
37

38

o!
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ed that it is "obvious and unarguable" that no governmental mterest is
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35 See Snyderv. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
36

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
See generally Volokh, supra note 20.
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38

o!

370

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

[Vol. 3:2]

~usse~ the WikiLeaks situation by explaining the organization's past,
mtent10ns, and the released documents. Part III evaluates the First
~endme_nt' s public concern doctrine. Part IV discusses three except~ons to Frrst Amendment immunity: (1) the national security exception; (2) the true threats doctrine; and (3) the umbrella of crimefacilita~g speech. Part V lays out a balancing test for assessing when
speech 1s unprotected by the First Amendment in regard to its value to
society and the harm created under the national security exception, the
true threats doctrine, and crime-facilitation. Part VI concludes that
WikiLeaks will not be protected by First Amendment immunity if
prosecuted for harm to U.S. informants or soldiers because it does not
pass the balancing test.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WIKILEAKS

ge 40

"They called me the James Bond ofjournalism, " - Julian Assan-

WikiLeaks is a whistle-blowing website that provides an anonymo_us ;vay ~or ~our~es to l~ak information to joumalists. 41 The organizat10n s O~J~ctlve is_ to ~nng transparency to both private and public
2
sector dec1s10n-making. In 2010, many of the publications released
by WikiLeaks were classified U.S. military and diplomatic cables. 43
This caused many government officials to wonder if the U.S. government can, or should, try to limit WikiLeaks' freedom of speech in the
name of national security. 44

with a U.S. intelligence agency, unless the United States has publicly acknowledged
or revealed the relationship; or
(3) un~e~ The Espio~age Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793, (2011), which prohibits the gathering,
transrmtting, or receipt of defense information with the intent or reason to believe the
informa~i on will be used against the United States or to the benefit of a foreign nation.
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A. What is WikiLeaks?
WikiLeaks is a website that was founded in 2007 by a group of
government-transparency activists and Julian Assang~, a 39-ye~r-old
Australian. 45 Assange "used years of computer hacking expenence,
and what friends call a near genius I.Q.," to establish WikiLeaks and
redefine whistle-blowing. 46 WikiLeaks operates as a non-profit organization, with very small operating expenses and no paid salaries for its
staff members including Assange. 47 WikiLeaks argues that, because
they are not m~tivated by making money, it is easier to coo~erate with
other publishing and media organizations around the globe m order to
attract as much attention as possible. 48 The organization does this by
making the original documents available so that readers can verify the
49
.
source documents.
Before publication, WikiLeaks ensures that documents are genuine by conducting a forensic analysis of the materi~l to detei:m~e t~~
cost of forgery and claims of the apparent authonng orgamzat10n..
Additionally, WikiLeaks outsources verification analysis to media
organizations like the New York Times (U.S.), The Guardian (U.K.)
and Der Spiegel (Germany). In the case of the Afghan and Iraq War
Logs, these three prominent newspapers were given copies ~f. the cables months before their release on WikiLeaks, on the condition that
51
all of the organizations coordinated the release date. The simult~ne
ous publication sparked worldwide attention and allowed _the publishers to focus on specific stories to target a broader readership.
To understand the legal quandary WikiLeaks presents, it is vital to
know how the website functions. WikiLeaks promises protection for
its sources and claims that the website "provides a high security anonymous drop box fortified by cutting-edge cryptographic techn~logies."52 The organization operates a number of servers across multiple
· occurs ear1y m
. the process. 53
international jurisdictions and anonymity
WikiLeaks obscures submissions in junk data, then routes them
through servers in Sweden, Belgium, and Iceland-countries with
45 Wild Gaga: No Technology Can Protect Whistle-Blowers from Themselves, THE ECONOMIST (June 10, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/16335810.
46 Bums & Somaiya supra note 11.
,
47 Kim Zetter, Wikileaks Cash Flows in, Drips Out, WIRED (July 12, 2010)
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /wikileaks-funding.
48
WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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LEIGH supra note 9, at 11 7.
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WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41.
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strict laws protecting journalists and the disclosure of confidential
55
sources. 54 As a result, WikiLeaks calls itself "multi-jurisdictional"
because it is nearly impossible for a single government to force a doc56
ument's removal from its servers.
57
WikiLeaks' technology operates on a Tor network. The creation
of a Tor network is the key to WikiLeaks' security because only the
first proxy server, the entry node, ever communicates directly with the
user. 58 The first server relays the documents to the second, the second
to the third, and so on. In the end, the system prevents any one node
59
from being able to trace activity back to the original user. The system began small, but WikiLeaks' network now encompasses over 700
servers around the world60 and shutting down the network by legal
61
means would be complex because there is no central authority.
Therefore, while a court order in one country may impact several
servers, the removal of a substantial portion of WikiLeaks servers
62
would require multinational cooperation.
Any efforts by the U.S. government to interdict WikiLeaks
through an injunction would likely have almost no effect on the organization. 63 In 2008, a Switzerland-based bank sued WikiLeaks after
WikiLeaks published documents that demonstrated the bank's complicity in tax evasion. 64 A U.S. federal district court judge issued an
injunction, but WikiLeaks simply moved to a new domain name, with

65
the documents still available to searchers. Admitting defeat, the
66
judge dissolved the injunction two weeks after instituting it. This
demonstrates how easily WikiLeaks can manipulate its organization
67
and information beyond the control of hostile judicial regimes.
Furthermore, States have not been successful shutting down Wik68
iLeaks through software code rather than legal measures. The organ69
ization survived both a massive denial of service attack and the
withdrawal of hosting services. 70 Even authoritarian regimes have
71
been unable to tame the organization's power completely because
WikiLeaks is designed to exist beyond the reach of any single government. 72 Therefore, governments should be wary of any efforts to
enjoin WikiLeaks and prosecution must be done post-facto, which
may deter similar organizations from publishing harmful information.73

B. What Has WikiLeaks Done?
74
WikiLeaks published classified information long before 2010.
Yet, the first time the organization captured international media attention was on April 5, 2010, with the release of a 38-minute clip of
cockpit video from a 2007 air strike by an American Apache helicop-

65
66
54

Wild Gaga: No Technology Can Protect Whistle-Blowers from Themselves, THE ECONOMIST (June 10, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/16335810
(in Sweden it is a crime to disclose a source, in Belgium a wiretapped conversation
with a journalist is inadmissible in court, and in Iceland Assange has worked with
legislators to draft tough free-speech laws).
55 Id.
56 See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (District Court declined to uphold an injunction against WikiLeaks' publication
of secret bank records).
57
WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 41.
58 Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, 13 No. 11 J.
lNTERNETL. 22, 32 (2010).
59 Id.
60 Dealing with WikiLeaks: The Right Reaction, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 9,
2010) http://www.economist.com/node/17677820.
61
Abbott, supra note 58, at 26.
62 Id.
63 Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, Brooklyn Law School Studies
Research Papers, Accepted Paper Series, No. 218 (Feb. 2011) at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 757890 [hereinafter Bambauer].
64 See Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd. V. Wikileaks, Case No. 3:2008cv00824
(N.D. Cal. 2008), available at
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/3:2008cv00824/200125/.
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See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal.

2008).
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See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 5.
Id. at 6.
69 Id. (citing Gregg Keizer, DoS attacks hammer WikiLeaks for second day
running, COMPUTERWORLD, (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9198679/DoS_attacks_hammer_WikiLeaks
_for_second_day_running) (allegedly launched by a hacker sympathetic to the U.S.
government).
70 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 6 (citing Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon
Says WikiLeaks Violated Terms of Service, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2010), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703377504575651321402763304.ht
ml).
71
Bambauer, supra note 63, at 6.
72
Id. at 7.
73 Eric Sterner, WikiLeaks and Cyberspace Cultures in Conflict, THE GEORGE
C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE 3 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter, Sterner] ("Wikileaks represents a
growing trend that will undermine the long-term utility of the internet for commerce
and governance.").
74 Matt Warman, WikiLeaks: Top 5 Leaks, THE TELEGRAPH, (Feb. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/7128244/WikiLeaks-Top5-leaks.html (Some notable leaks included documents on: Guantanamo Bay detention
operation, the contents of Sarah Palin's personal Yahoo email account, and the membership rolls of the neo-Nazi British National Party).
68
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ter in Baghdad. 75 The video showed the helicopter gunning down at
least 12 people, including two civilians later identified as Reuters
journalists. 76 Specialist Bradley Manning, a 22-year-old Army intelligence analyst, was arrested for disclosure of the helicopter footage.
He later confessed that he had also given over 260,000 classified documents to WikiLeaks. 77
The next noteworthy WikiLeaks release occurred on July 25,
2010, when the organization disclosed approximately 77,000 individual classified war logs from the U.S. military in Afghanistan. 78 The
Afghan War Logs contained reports used by desk officers in the Pent~gon. and tr~ops in the field to mak~ operational plans and prepare
9
~1tuat10nal bnefings on the war zone. Most of the reports contained
~ ~he Afghan War Logs are routine, even mundane, but they added
m~1~ht, texture, and context to the nine-year war effort. 80 Days later,
WikiLeaks released 15,000 additional classified documents which
were held for minor redactions. 81 By the end of this wave of releases
'
WikiLeaks had posted 92,201records. 82
The release was met with mixed reaction. Many praised WikiLeaks, including Daniel Ellsberg, the man who leaked the Pentagon
Pa~~rs to the New York Times in 1971. Ellsberg said, "I've been
wa1tmg 40 years for someone to disclose information on a scale that
might really make a difference." 83 Others remained apathetic to the
real substance of the leaked material. As The Economist stated "the
diary seems to be long on details, but short on revelations." 84 Sirilarly, President Obama stated that the information was old and thus did
not reflect current realities. 85
75

LEIGH, supra note 9, at 70.
Eric Schmidt, In Disclosing Secrets, Wikileaks Seeks 'Transparency,' N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 20 l 0, at All.
77
Elizabeth Bumiller, Army Leak Suspect is Turned in, by Ex-Hacker, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at Al.
78
LEIGH, supra note 9, at 116.
79
Afghanistan: Don't Go Back, THE ECONOMIST (July 29, 20 l 0)
http://www.economist.com/node/166933 l 3.
80
A Note to Readers: Piecing Together the Reports and Deciding What to
Publish, N.Y.TIMEs, July 26 2010 at A8.
81
.
,
Sarah C. Sulhvan, A Closer Look at Wikileaks' Past, Future, PBS
NEWSHOUSE (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/july-dec 1O/wikileaks 07-26.html.
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John O'Loughlin et al., Peering into the Fog of War: The Geography of
the WikiLeaks Afghanistan War Logs, 2004-2009, EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECON
473 (2010).
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However, many were quick to condemn the disclosures, including
top U.S. officials who accused WikiLeaks of risking the lives of Afghan informants. 86 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates claimed, "the
battlefield consequences are potentially severe and dangerous for our
troops our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage
our rela87
tionships and reputation in that key part of the world." Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "Mr. Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good . . . but the truth
is, [WikiLeaks] might already have on their hands the blood of some
88
young soldier or that of an Afghan family."
Along with the U.S. military commanders, a coalition of humanrights groups 89 critic~zed Assan~; for ~~iling to re~~ct the names ~n~
locations of Afghan mformants. Add1t10nally, WikiLeaks drew cnt1cism from journalists and scholars, who have contrasted WikiLeaks'
wide-ranging disclosure with the more measured approach taken by
91
the media outlets that received early access to the documents.
Assange responded via Twitter, suggesting that human-rights
groups
92
had refused to help WikiLeaks in redacting the documents. He also
blamed the U.S. military for putting its own Afghan sources at risk:
"[t]his material was available to every soldier and contractor in Af-

Id.
David Leigh, Wikileaks 'has blood on its hands' over Afghan War Logs,
Claim U.S. Officials, THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2010, at p.9 of the Main section.
88 Id. (Admiral Mullen was speaking to the fact that some of the released
documents included the names, villages, and families of informants in Afghanistan).
89 Eben Harrell, Wikileaks Comes Under Fire from Rights Groups, TIME,
.
Aug. 12, 2010, available at
http://www. time.come/time/world/article/O ,8599,20103 09 ,00 .html (groups mcluded
Amnesty International, the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, the Open
Society Institute, and Reporters Without Borders).
90 Id.; See also Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim
Federal Reporter's Privilege in Any Form, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 667, 684 (2011),
available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_peters/l [hereinafter Peters] (referencing the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics whic~ states, under the
subhead "Minimize Harm," "Journalists should ... show compass10n for those who
may be affected by news coverage ... [and] recognize that gathe~g and reporting
information may cause harm or discomfort ... pursuit of the news ts not a ltcense for
86

87

arrogance.").
91 See Bambauer, supra note 63, at 8.
92 Philip Shenon, U.S. Urges Allies to Crack Down on Wikileaks, ~HE DAILY
BEAST, Aug. 10, 2010, available at http://thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stones/201008-1 O/a-westem-crackdown-on-wikileaks/ (citing Assange's Twitter post: "Pentagon
wants to bankrupt us by refusing to assist review. Media won't take responsibility.
Amnesty won't. What to do?").
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~hanistan_. ·: it's the U.S. military that deserves the blame for not givmg due diligence to its informers. " 93
In October 2010, WikiLeaks released a cache of almost 400 000
classified documents known as the "Iraq War Logs." 94 Similar t~ the
Afghan War Logs, the classified documents were daily war efforts
recorded by U.S. so~di~r~ ?n the ground. The Iraq War Logs cataloged
the number of Iraqi civilians that died, many at the hands of other
95
Iraqis. In the Iraq War Logs, WikiLeaks appeared to be making an
effort to minimize the risk to civilians 96 by developing an algorithm to
e:ase names and locations of persons listed. 97 Unfortunately, the algonthm system was not foolproof and the U.S. government identified
the names of at least 300 Iraqis who were believed to be "particularly
vulnerable in light of this exposure." 98
Finally, on November 30, 2010, WikiLeaks released over four
deca.des of U.S. diplomatic cables that originated from 274 U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions. 99 This time, Assange
aske100the U.S. government to help redact the secret diplomatic cables.. !he State Department refused to cooperate, stating that the
pubhcatton of classified material violates U.S. law and therefore it
·ir
.
101
'
was unwi mg to .assist WikiLeaks. In response, Assange accused
the U.S. of adopting a confrontational stance and indicated his intent
to publis~ the mate?~I with or without assistance in redacting. 102 Unable to dissuade WikiLeaks from leaking the cables, the White House
released a statement on November 28, 201 O to mitigate potential out-
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WikiLeaker rejects blood-on-hands claim, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 2, 2010,
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cry and condemn the release. 103 Days later, Attorney General Eric H.
Holder Jr. stated that the Justice Department and the Pentagon were
conducting "an active, ongoing criminal investigation" into involve. th e orgamza
. t"ton. 104
ment with
.
105
The release of the diplomatic cables had a much larger impact
on the Obama administration than the Afghan and Iraq War Logs
lease. The first installment contained 220 cables, only some of which
106
were redacted to protect diplomatic sources. Mostly, the do~uments
contained many obvious revelations spelled out by U.S. diplomats
around the world. 107 State Department officials privately told Congress that they expected overall damage to ~.S. foreign P?licy to be
containable. 108 Nevertheless, the leaks contamed a few nattonal s~cu
rity risks including a long list of commercial and private installat10ns
109 Th
'
·
·
.
deemed critical
to Amenca's
nat10nal
secunty.
ese reve1aftons,

:e-
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points of undersea cables, the names of firms makmg vital vaccmes; and big ports.
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along with often embarrassing comments by U.S. diplomats, undoubtedly had an impact on U.S. diplomatic relationships around the
110
world. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the release as an
attack on the U.S. and the entire international diplomatic community.111
II. THE RIGHT TO DISCLOSE MATTERS OF "PUBLIC
CONCERN"

The Supreme Court stalwartly protects speech when it involves
"public issues" such as "economic, social, and political subjects." 112
Furthermore, the Court considers speech on public concerns to be on
the "highest rung" of constitutional protection, and "at the heart of the
First Amendment." 113 The Supreme Court has never clearly defined
the difference between matters of public concern and those of mere
. t e concern. 114 Wh.l
. of speech are protected unpnva
1 e b oth categones
der the First Amendment, speech on matters of private concern, which
have little social value, are accorded less protection than speech on
matters that affect the public at large. 115 The Supreme Court reasons
that restricting speech on purely private issues does not implicate the
same constitutional concerns as limitations to speech on matters of
public interest. 116
One possible definition of public concern would include any
speech that is relevant to any political, social, or scientific controversy. The Supreme Court took this view in Florida Star v. B.JF., where
it concluded that the name of a rape victim was a matter of "public
significance" because of its connection to a reported crime, and thereBut the list had obvious omissions and nothing on it was secret. Published on the
Pentagon's website it would hardly have raised an eyebrow.").
110
Glenn Kessler, Cables reveal intricacies of US. diplomacy, WASH. POST.
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804278 2.html.
111
Ewen MacAskill, Hillary Clinton Attack Release of US. Embassy Cables,
GUARDIAN, (Nov. 29, 2010), available at
http://~.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/clinton-reacts-us-embassy-cables.

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011)(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)).
114
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1166.
115
See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Farwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
116
.
Synder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215-16 ("That is because restricting speech on purely pnvate matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting
speech on matters of public interest: '[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate
of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas."' (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760.)).
113

fore publishing the name was fully protected speech. Only Justice
Scalia's solo concurrence in Florida Star acknowledged that this information may be considered private, since a ban on publishing the
name of rape victims might be justified as a means of preventing fur118
ther attacks aimed at intimidating or silencing the victim. Under the
Court's approach in Florida Star, only a few topics would qualify as
private concerns that may justify limitations on speech.
Another example of the Supreme Court applying a sweeping definition of the public concern doctrine is in Bartnicki, where an unknown person illegally taped a telephone conversation between Gloria
Bartnicki, an employee of the Pennsylvania Educators' Association,
119
and the President of the local teachers' union. The tape was later
120
given to Vopper, a local radio host who played it on air. Bartnicki
121
brought suit against Vopper for civil damages. The Court held that
the media was generally free to publish material on matters of public
concern, even if it was drawn from telephone conversations that were
illegally gathered by third parties. 122 Overall, Bartnicki limits the privacy rights of individuals when there is an issue of public significance , even those as trivial as the activities of a local teachers' un.

I On.

123

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's definition of a private concern is less clear than its definition of a public concern. In Dun &
Bradstreet, the Supreme Court provided an example of private speech
when it held that information about a particular individual's credit
"124 b
.
. ISsue
.
report "concerns no publ1c
ecause the speech was " so1e1y Ill
.
"fi
d"
,,125
the individual interest of the speaker and its spec1 1c au 1ence.
This conclusion was supported by the fact that the particular report
was sent to only five subscribers by the reporting service, all of whom
.
.
. furth 126
were bound to not d1ssemmate 1t
er.
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires
the Court to examine the "content, form, and context" of that speech,

Florida Starv. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1981).
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
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Id. at 519.
121 Bartnicki v. Vopper (Bartnicki II), 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1999)
(plaintiffs brought civil damages under Federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping acts).
122 Bartnicld, 532 U.S. at 533.
123 Id. at 536 ("[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.").
124 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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"as revealed by the whole record." 127 "As in other First Amendment
cases, the court is obligated to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record"' to insure that, "the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." 128 In considering
content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary
to evaluate the circumstances of the speech. If the judge concludes
that the speech is a matter of public concern it is entitled to "special
protecti.on" under the F"rrst Amendment. 129 In summary, if speech relates to a matter of political or social controversy it is a matter of public concern. But speech, even political speech, can be private speech if
it does not add to the public discourse and is solely in the interest of
the speaker and his intended audience.
If the speech is within this broad category of public concern, "the
publication of truthful information that is lawfully acquired enjoys
considerable First Amendment protection." 130 In Florida Star, the
Supreme Court tried to limit this protection by refusing to hold- that
"truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First
131
Amendment." The Court found that persons could be held liable for
such speech, but only if there was an interest of the highest order. 132
Even in Bartnicki, where the information was illegally obtained, the
Court held that the press is protected so long as it did not participate in
.
. 133
the 1·11ega1 mtercept10n.
In conclusion, the freedom of speech and
press outweigh most privacy and security interests.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY EXCEPTIONS
Speech on war efforts and government activities is at the heart of
First 134
Amendment protections as defined in the public concern doc. e.
However, th ere are except10ns
.
· Amendment law that
trin
to Frrst
allow the speaker's constitutional immunities to be waived in extreme
circumstances. Three exceptions are discussed below: national security concerns, the true threats doctrine, and crime-facilitating speech.

:~;

Snyder, 131 S. C~. at 1211 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761).
Id at 1216 (quotmg Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984)).
129
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
130
ELSEA, supra note 28, at 19.
131
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1981).
132
Id. at 541.
133 B
. ki
artnIC v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) ("We think it clear ... that
a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield
from speech about a matter of public concern.").
134
See supra, Part III.
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A. The National Security Exception
When including the First Amendment, the drafters of the Constitution wanted to protect the public's right to discuss government affairs openly. 135 Yet, during the drafting of the Constitution, there was
a group of dissenters who did not want the press to have broad authority to publish government information such as "military operations or
affairs of great consequences." 136 This argument has evolved into the
. 1secunty
. except"10n t o fr ee speech . 137
nat10na
1. The National Security Exception as Provided in Near
v. Minnesota
The national security exception was further developed in 1931, in
Near v. Minnesota. In Near, the Defendant was charged under a Minnesota statute that provided for the abatement of his newspaper as a
public nuisance 138 because he often accused politicians and police
officers of conspiring with Jewish gangs. 139 The Supreme Court
struck down the statute and held that any judicial orders preventing
.
. restram
. t ."140
speech constitute
a " pnor
A prior restraint, by defmition, is an immediate and irreversible
sanction that freezes speech for a time period specified by the government.141 In the context of the freedom of speech, prior restraints
are considered "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights." 142 Therefore, it is helpful to study the national security exception in prior restraint cases because they place a
heavy burden on the government to prove a national security risk.
In Near, the Supreme Court also crafted an exception for prior restraints, holding that prior restraints are constitutional "in exceptional
cases" including preventing "actual obstructions to [government] recruiting service[s], or the publication of the sailing dates of transports,
or the number and location of troops." 143 The Court did not explain
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Id. at 273-74.
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Id. at 274.
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Nearv. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 701 (1931).
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Id. at 704.
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Id at 732.
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"as revealed by the whole record." 127 "As in other First Amendment
cases, the court is obligated to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record"' to insure that, "the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." 128 In considering
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131
Amendment." The Court found that persons could be held liable for
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Even in Bartnicki, where the information was illegally obtained, the
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133
the illegal interception. In conclusion, the freedom of speech and
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY EXCEPTIONS
Speech on war efforts and government activities is at the heart of
First Amendment protections as defined in the public concern doctrine.134 However, there are exceptions to First Amendment law that
allow the speaker's constitutional immunities to be waived in extreme
circumstances. Three exceptions are discussed below: national security concerns, the true threats doctrine, and crime-facilitating speech.

~~: Snyder, 131 S. C~. at 1211 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761).
Id. at 1216 (quotmg Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)).
129
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
130
ELSEA, supra note 28, at 19.
131
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1981).
132
Id. at 541.
133 B
. ki
artntc v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) ("We think it clear ... that
a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield
from speech about a matter of public concern.").
134
See supra, Part III.
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the scope of this exception or if it reached beyond threats to national
144
security, but this statement has been frequently upheld.
2. The Pentagon Papers and the Evolution of the National Security Exception
A famous application of the national security exception is in New
York Times Co. v. United States, commonly referred to as the "Penta145
The "Pentagon Papers" referred to a report,
gon Papers" case.
commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, entitled
"History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy, 19451967."146 The report, containing over 7,000 pages on America's activities in Vietnam, detailed illicit covert actions and the deliberate withholding of pertinent information from the American public. 147 The
Supreme Court decided the high profile case only eighteen days after
the first installment appeared in the New York Times. 148
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion contained only three
paragraphs and simply stated that the government faces an extremely
high burden in seeking prior restraints, a burden the government failed
149
to meet. Joined by six Justices, the ruling denied the injunction. 150
Yet, each Justice balanced national security and freedom of speech a
little differently. Although the Pentagon Papers case established little
legal precedent, the opinions provide significant insight into the national security exception to the First Amendment. 151
First, Justice Stewart's opinion created the test for future national
security exception cases. He held that disclosure of classified information is only prohibited when the publication will "surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its peo152
ple."
Furthermore, he acknowledged that Congress could enact
"specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets." 153 Ultimately, Justice Stewart
agreed with the majority, but gave deference to national security;
144

Volokh, supra note 20, at 1129.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
146
Judson 0. Littleton, Eliminating Public Disclosures of Government Information from the Reach of the Espionage Act, 86 Tux. L. REv. 889, 892 (2008).
147 Id.
145

148
149
150
151
152

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 958.
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 713.
Id.
Kovarovic, supra note 135, at 288.
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis add-

ed).
153

Id.
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On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas held that prior restraints are never allowed to protect national security interests. Justice
Black asserted that the Government has no power to censor the press
. D ougbecause the press censors the Government. 154 s·nm·1ar1y, Justlce
las stated that the press must act vigilantly to unearth government
corruption. 155 He argued that secrecy in government is fundamentally
anti-democratic and open discussion of public policy is vital to our
national health. 156
The other Justices put more weight on the side of national security. Justice Brennan argued that, in this case, the attempt to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers fell short of the high standard needed
for a prior restraint. In the future, however, he believed that there may
be a national security dilemma that could allow an injunction of publication. 157 Justice Brennan proposed that prior restraints should only
be allowed when the government has proof that the publication will
"inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an
158
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea."
Next, Justice White looked to the Legislative branch to deal with
the problem. 159 He concluded that Congress has not addressed the
issue of preemptively limiting free speech in the name of national
security. 160 Therefore, Congress must rely on the deterrent effect of
criminal sanctions on an irresponsible press and not on prior restraints. 161 Analogously, Justice Marshall looked to find a statute under which Congress had given the Executive the power to stop the
publication, but determined that Congress had specifically rejected

154

Id. at 717 (Black, J. concurring) (arguing, duty of the free press is "to
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.").
155 Id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he impairment of the ... security
of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary
need of a vigilant and courageous press") (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
719-20 (1931)).
156
Id. at 724.
157 Id. at 724-725 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]ur judgments in the present
cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary
stays and restraining orders to block the publication of materials sought to be suppressed by the Government.").
158
Id. at 728.
159 Id. at 740 (White, J. concurring) (focusing on the application of the Espionage Act of 1917).
160 Id.
161 Id.
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passing legislation that would give the President the power to enjoin
the New York Times. 162
The three dissenters uniformly expressed dissatisfaction with the
haste in which the Court decided the case and gave more weight to
national security than to the First Amendment. Justice Harlan, writing
for the dissent, held that the Judiciary should stay out of this matter
because the decision was one of foreign policy, which is clearly within the scope of the Executive. 163 He argued that this decision is for the'
political departments of the government, the Executive and Legislative, stating, "[the decision is] delicate, complex, and involve[s] large
elements of prophecy [which] ... should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil." 164
In conclusion, the case is not as concrete as many perceive it to
be. Only two Justices gave an unequivocal right of expression to the
165
First Amendment. Importantly, seven of the nine Justices acknowledged the existence and power of the national security exception.

3. Contemporary Approaches and Application of
the Direct, Immediate and Irreparable Test
Shortly after the Pentagon Papers case, the dilemma of prior restraints was raised again in United States v. Progressive, where a federal district court issued an injunction to keep a magazine from publishing an article on how to build a hydrogen bomb. 166 The court balanced the freedom of speech against national security, stating: "few
things, save grave national security concerns, are sufficient to override
First Amendment interests ... [and yet, we are also] convinced that
the government has a right to classify certain sensitive documents to
167
protect its national security." The court held that the publication of'
technical information on a hydrogen bomb is analogous to the publication of troop movements, which falls within the narrow exception of
162

Id. at 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("When Congress specifically
declines to make conduct unlawful it is not for this Court to redecide those issues.").
163
Id. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The very nature of Executive decisions
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.") (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
164 Id.
165
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New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 716-23 (Black and
Douglas, JJ.).
166
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (D. Wis. 1979) (although the article was mostly information in the public domain, the Court held that
publication violated the Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
167
Id. at 992-93.
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168

prior restraints, as discussed in Near. Furthermore, the court applied
Justice Stewart's reasoning in the Pentagon Papers case for the national security exception, 169 stating that the information could potentially pose a "direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the United
170
States."
Next, the Supreme Court allowed prior restraints to protect national security in Snepp v. United States where the Court held that the
government could insist that a former CIA agent submit his book to
171
the CIA for prepublication review.
Snepp is noteworthy as the
broadest holding by the Supreme Court on this issue because it allowed a prior restraint on the basis of the national security exception,
even absent any evidence that the contents of the book were damaging
to security interests. 172 Another recent example of the national security exception is Haig v. Agee where the Court held that an ex-CIA
agent's, "repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of
intelligence personnel," were as constitutionally unprotected as "the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." 173 In particular, the Court said that the First Amendment did not protect disclosures when they were done to obstruct "in174
telligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel."

B. The True Threats Exception
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no First Amendment
protection for a "true threat" 175 because, unlike political rhetoric or
176
other protected speech, "true threats" pose greater harm. Therefore,
168

Id. at 996 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 701-04 (1931).
See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730.
170 Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 996 (This case was dismissed on appeal
because independent foreign sources published the same information during the ap-.
peals process). See generally United States v. Progressive, Inc. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
171 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507 (1980)).
172 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 961.
173 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716).
174
Id. at 309.
175 CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000, (citing Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (1969); Madsen v. Women's Health Center 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994)).
176 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). The key case for defining when the government may punish advocacy of illegality is Brandenburg v. Ohio.
395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, a KKK leader is convicted under the Ohio
criminal syndicalism law for leading rallies for the KKK and showing films that in~it
ed racism and anti-Semitism. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional and a conviction for incitement is only constitutional ifthere is: (1) imminent
harm;' (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action; and (3) an intent to cause imminent
169
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advocating violence is protected, but threatening a person with violence is not. 177 The Supreme Court defined "true threats" in Watts v.
US., where an anti-Vietnam war protestor said, "if they ever make me
178
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." The
Court held that this statement was not a true threat because it was po179
litical hyperbole and thus was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court later held that certain threats are unworthy of First
180
Amendment protection, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. In R.A. V., the
petitioner was charged with violating the St. Paul Bias Motivated
181
Crime Ordinance for burning a cross on a black family's lawn. The
Court reasoned that true threats are beyond the scope of First
Amendment protection, which is meant to protect "individuals from
the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from
182
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Hence, the
true threats doctrine was designed to protect potential victims from
183
both actual violence and the reasonable apprehension of fear. If the
target of the threat takes steps to protect himself, or is in some way
disrupted from his normal course of activities, the deliverer of the
threat can be punished regardless of his intent or capacity to execute
the threat. 184
However, the Supreme Court has never clearly defined what constitutes a "true threat" and now there is a split among the circuits as to
the definition. 185 In Watts, the Court suggested that a statement should
be evaluated in its context, taking into account its conditional nature
and the reaction of listeners. 186 In light of the limited guidance providillegality. "The issue of "true threats" is related to Brandenburg because it involves
speech that threatens violence, yet it is a distinct issue because the focus is not on the
likely consequences, but on the need to protect people from the adverse effects of
feeling threatened." Id. Due to the strict limitations for restricting speech under the
incitement test, this note will not focus on incitement because it is unlikely that the
speech was imminent or that WikiLeaks had the intent to harm informants.
177 Id.
178
Id. at 706.
179 Id. at 708 ("[T]he statute initially requires the Government to prove a true
threat. We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner
fits within that statutory term.").
180
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
181
Id. at 379-80.
182
Id. at 388.
183
Id. See also Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("The speaker
need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats
protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders,
as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.").
184
Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313.
185
CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000.
186
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
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ed by the Supreme Court, lower courts have been left largely to their
own devices to develop true threats jurisprudence. 187 For instance, the
Second Circuit has held that a "true threat" is assessed from the perspective for the reasonable speaker, 188 while the Ninth Circuit has
defined a "true threat" from the perspective of the reasonable listener.189
Despite these variances, commentators generally regard the standard set forth by the Second Circuit in United States v. Kelner 190 as the
most speech-protective test created by the lower courts. 191 In Kelner, a
member of the Jewish Defense League was convicted for threatening
to assassinate Y asser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. 192 In recognition of First Amendment concerns advanced by the Supreme Court in Watts, the Second Circuit held that
an expression may be considered a true threat "[s]o long as the threat
on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution." 193 The Court reasoned that a narrow construction of "threat"
was intended by Watts and necessary to ensure the preservation of
First Amendment rights. 194
More recently, however, the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Malik, has retreated from its strict speaker-based construction. 195 Malik was charged with mailing threatening communications to adversaries in his lawsuit, their families, and a United States federal
judge. 196 The Second Circuit held that the absence of explicitly threatening language does not necessarily preclude the finding of a threat. 197

187

See Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313 (citing Robert Kurman, United States v.
Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 303
(1998) (documenting that the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of
cases that presented an opportunity to clarify its true threats doctrine)).
188
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976).
189
See Lovell v. Poway Unified District, 90 F .3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); See
also Weiss, supra note 30, at 1320.
190
See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020.
191
Weiss, supra note 30, at 1315.
192

Kelner, 534 F .2d at 1020-21 (Kelner was convicted under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 875(c) which prohibits threatening language and extortion).
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Id. at 1027.
Id.
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Id. at 47-48.
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Id. at 49 (The Second Circuit clarified that ambiguous threats, standing
alone, cannot establish a predicate for criminal liability. However, if substantial additional contextual evidence is presented- including evidence of the recipients' states
194
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carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." The
Court held that this statement was not a true threat because it was po179
litical hyperbole and thus was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court later held that certain threats are unworthy of First
180
Amendment protection, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. In R.A. V., the
petitioner was charged with violating the St. Paul Bias Motivated
181
Crime Ordinance for burning a cross on a black family's lawn. The
Court reasoned that true threats are beyond the scope of First
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182
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183
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speech was imminent or that WikiLeaks had the intent to harm informants.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 706.
179
Id. at 708 ("[T]he statute initially requires the Government to prove a true
threat. We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner
fits within that statutory term.").
180
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
181
Id. at 379-80.
182
Id. at 388.
183
Id. See also Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("The speaker
need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats
protects individuals from the fear of violence and the _disruption that fear engenders,
as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.").
184
Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313.
185
CHEMERINSKY supra note 31, at 1000.
186
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
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First Amendment rights. 194
More recently, however, the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Malik, has retreated from its strict speaker-based construction. 195 Malik was charged with mailing threatening communications to adversaries in his lawsuit, their families, and a United States federal
196
judge. The Second Circuit held that the absence of explicitly threatening language does not necessarily preclude the finding of a threat. 197

187

See Weiss, supra note 30, at 1313 (citing Robert Kurman, United States v.
Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. R.Ev. 287, 303
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Furthermore, in evaluating Malik' s arguably ambiguous threats, the
Court adhered to a reasonable listener test, which allowed for contextual evidence to clarify whether ambiguous language constituted a,
true threat. 198 Ultimately, the Court did not find that the defendant had
First Amendment immunity in regards to this potential "true threat."
A Ninth Circuit case that considered both definitions put forth by
the Second Circuit was Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 199 where the Defendants terrorized abortion providers
with disturbing posters, online campaigns, and how-to guides on violent intimidation. 200 One of the documents posted, the "Nuremberg
Files," included the names and home addresses of the Plaintiff abortion providers and compared their actions to Nazi war criminals in
World War II. 201 The messages were so violent the FBI stepped in to
offer protection. 202 Furthermore, the postings were carried out in a
period of escalating violence towards abortion providers, in one cir. murder. 203
cumstance ending m
The Defendants wanted the Court to apply the Second Circuit
standard, which strips First Amendment immunity from true threats
only when they are stated, "so unequivocal[ly], unconditional[ly],
immediate[ly] and specific[ally] as to the person threatened, as to
convey ... imminent prospect of execution."204 However, the Ninth
Circuit ruled against the protestors, fmding that the First Amendment
does not protect this speech when a reasonable person would foresee
the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault, considered in light of their entire factual context. 205 In conclusion, the
Court found that the Nuremberg Files, containing names and addresses, constituted a "true threat" and Defendants were given no First
Amendment immunity protection.

of mind and their reactions - "the existence of a 'true threat' is a question best left to
a jury.").
198
199
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Id.

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
200
Id. at 1012.
201
Id. at 1012-13.
202
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998).
203
Id. at 1188 (referencing the murder of Dr. David Gunn in March, 1993 by
the anti-abortionist Christian terrorist, Michael F. Griffin).
204
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1976).
205
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.
2001).
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C. Crime-Facilitating Speech and the Hit Man Handbook

The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the issue of
when crime-facilitating speech should be unprotected by the First
Amendment. 206 However, the concept of crime-facilitating speech
weaves through a number of many seemingly disparate decisions in
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts. 207 The doctrine itself is
becoming more important as scholars have begun to link these disparate cases in order to develop a clear rule on crime facilitation and the
First Amendment. One scholar, Eugene Volokh, defmes crimefacilitating speech as:
1.) any communication that,
2.) intentionally or not,
3.) conveys information that,
4.) makes it easier or safer for some readers:
(a) to commit crimes, torts, act of war; or
(b) to get away with committing such act. 208

Examples of crime-facilitating speech range from a website that
publicizes the names and addresses of boycott violators 209 to a newspaper that publishes personal information about witnesses to a
crime. 210 In the area of national security, crime-facilitating speech
may include a newspaper's publication of the sailing dates of troop. 211 secret rm·1·1tary p1ans, 212 or the names of undercover agents m
.
sh1ps,
206

See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
208
Id. at 1103.
209
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (rejecting
lawsuit that was based partly on distribution of boycott violators' names). See also
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099.
210
See Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that based on the factual determination of whether the information was
newsworthy, a newspaper may be held liable for to the publication of the identities of
people in the witness protection program). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 1098-99
(including the publication of"the name of a witness to a crime" as possible speech
that aids in the commission of crime).
211
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (''No one
would question but that a government might prevent ... the "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops"). See also Volokh, supra
note 20, at 1099.
212
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733-34 (1971)
(White, J., concurring). See also Volokh supra note 20, at 1098 (noting that although
Congress declined to give the President the power in time of war to "proscribe, under
threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various categories of information related
to national defense .... [M]embers of Congress appeared to have little doubt that
207
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198 Id.
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Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
200
Id. at 1012.
201
Id. at 1012-13.
202 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998).
203 Jd. at 1188 (referencing the murder of Dr. David Gunn in March, 1993 by
the anti-abortionist Christian terrorist, Michael F. Griffin).
204 United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1976).
205 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 244 F .3d 1007 (9th Cir.
2001).
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enemy counties. 213 One example of a court denying a defendant First
Amendment immunity for crime-facilitating speech is the Hit Man
case. 214
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ing information about how easy it is to build a nuclear bomb may en222
hance the discussion of policies related to non-proliferation.

2. When Crime-Facilitating Speech is Restricted
1. Why is Crime-Facilitating Speech Valuable?
An analysis of crime-facilitating speech is incredibly helpful because it weighs how valuable or useful the speech is before it is restricted. 215 The Supreme Court assumes that all speech is valuable,
unless the speech falls under a limited number of specific exceptions. 216 Although the Supreme Court has not settled on a definition of
"valuable," it generally uses the term to describe a wide range of informational speech including educational, entertaining, political, religious, or scientific materials. 217 Frequently, instances of crimefacilitating speech are a mix of valuable and invaluable speech and
have a wide range of uses for readers. 218
Crime-facilitating speech may be valuable when it aids listeners in
making political decisions or investigating government misconduct. 219
The general public may be more likely to advocate for change in governmental policy when presented with persuasive and current proof of
alleged abuse. 22 For instance, a published study about the specific
ways that hijackers evade airport metal-detection equipment may fuel
political debate on the topic of airport security. 221 Similarly, publish-

The First Amendment has long protected speech that advocates il223
legality, even when the speech has no valuable purpose.
Yet,
speakers forgo this protection when the effect of the speech would
lead to imminent harm, 224 or when the speech is used as a guide to
violating a criminal statute. 225 In Hit Man, the Fourth Circuit held
"that the First Amendment does not pose a bar to a finding that Paladin is civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract
murders. " 226 The Court alluded that the Hit Man Handbook publica227
and
tion was offensive to the preservation of an ordered society,
noted that just because a publication takes a written form does not
228
mean that it is deserving of all constitutional immunities. In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit found that the jury could fmd the publisher

°

newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing
information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed.").
213
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981). See also Volokh, supra note
20, at 1098 (noting that the speech had "the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not
protected by the Constitution."); Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099-1100 (noting the
publication of "the names of undercover agents in enemy countries" as possible
crime-facilitating speech).
214
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-43 (4th Cir. 1997).
215
See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (explaining that crime-facilitating
speech may also help others engage in "legal or useful" behaviors).
216
See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 531 (1948) ("Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best ofliterature.").
217
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1111 (noting the "Court has pretty consistently
treated as "valuable" a wide range of commentary").
218
Id. at 1111-26.
219
Id. at 1114.
220
Id. (noting that "[a] general complaint that some unspecified abuse is
happening somewhere will naturally leave most listeners skeptical.").
221
Id. at 1118-19 (noting that the publication of this type of information can
"show that the government isn't doing enough to protect us). See generally Bruce
Schneier, More Airline Insecurities, CRYPTO-GRAMNEWSLETTER (Aug. 15, 2003,),

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0308.html (describing how anyone can theoretically smuggle plastic explosives onto a plane, or build a knife out of steel epoxy
glue on the plane itself, and concluding "[t] he point here is to realize that security
screening will never be 100% effective. There will always be ways to sneak guns,
knives, and bombs through security checkpoints. Screening is an effective component
of a security system, but it should never be the sole countermeasure in the system.").
222
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1119; but see U.S. v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (rejecting defendant's argument that "publication
[of an article detailing the specifics of hydrogen bombs] will provide the people with
needed information to make informed decisions on an urgent issue of public concern.").
223
Id. at 1111-26 (evaluating the possible valuable uses of crime-facilitating
speech, and specifically noting that "much crime-facilitating speech indeed has at
least some First Amendment value.").
224
See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
225
Id. (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949).
226 Id.
227
Id. (citing Giboney 336 u."s. 502) ("Such an expansive interpretation of
the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible
ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.").
228
·
Id. ("But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed.").
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equally liable for its part in the conspiracy because the publication
229
was integral in effectuating criminal activity.
On the other hand, punishing this kind of speech may set a difficult future precedent. 230 In Hit Man, the Fourth Circuit recognized that
231
a right to advocate lawlessness is one of the safeguards ofliberty. It
further noted that there are some circumstances in which it is necessary to restrict speech, especially when compelling concerns exist
about the distribution of material to large, undifferentiated audiences. 232 The Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment is not a bar to
liability, and they remanded the case to allow the jury to decide the
definition of valuable. 233 In conclusion, speech may lose the constitutional protections of the First Amendment when the speech lacks value and aids directly in the facilitation of crime.
IV. BALANCING WIKILEAKS

A. Defining the Balancing Test
As discussed above, the First Amendment offers a sweeping protection for civil and criminal liability and this immunity is only revoked in extreme circumstances. 234 Ultimately, the courts will decide
the matter of WikiLeaks' liability for any damage done by the organi235
This determination will
zation's publication of classified material.
require the judiciary to "balance" the value of the speech against the
harm that the speech causes. 236 In this note, the balancing test involves
balancing both the public concern doctrine and the potential valuable
uses of WikiLeaks, against the invaluable nature of the unredacted
logs and the First Amendment harmful speech exceptions. Because

393

the public concern doctrine is deeply rooted in First Amendment law,
the three minor exceptions might not be individually sufficient to defeat First Amendment immunity. Nevertheless, this note argues that
together the three are sufficient to prove that WikiLeaks is not shielded against liability if a case is brought against the organization. Overall, the courts should apply a balancing test to ensure that parts of
WikiLeaks' speech are protected but that the release of the informant's identities is not.
A balancing test is not perfect because judges are human and
therefore are susceptible to ideological and political in:fluences. 237 But,
judicial balancing tests are used in cases involving all of the First
Amendment doctrines discussed in this note, and therefore a balancing
test is an appropriate solution. First, courts are not precluded from
making any judgments about the inherent value of speech. 238 Various
First Amendment exceptions draw justification from the theory that
certain speech has virtually no constitutional value. 239 Second, courts
frequently balance the interests of the First Amendment with national
24
Finally, the true threats doctrine balances the
security concerns.
right to the freedom of speech with the need of the First Amendment
to protect citizens from fear of violence. 241 Therefore, a balancing test
is a natural way to look at novel ideas concerning WikiLeaks and potential harm to U.S. soldiers or informants in Afghanistan and Iraq.

°

Id.
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1141 (noting the various First Amendment exceptions and explaining the justifications for these exceptions).
231
238

229

Id. at 266-67 (holding, with confidence, that "the First Amendment does
not erect the absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability for which Paladin Press ..
. contend[s].").
230
See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1219 (noting that a decision like Rice's
"may set an unexpected and unwelcomed precedent for other situations.").
231
Rice 128 F.3d at 243 ("Even in a society oflaws, one of the most indispensable freedoms is that to express in the most impassioned terms the most passionate
disagreement with the laws themselves, the institutions of, and created by, law, and
the individual officials with whom the laws and institutions are entrusted.").
232
Id. at247 (citingHaigv. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981))
233
Id. at 250.
234
See supra Section IV.
235
Sterner, supra note 73, at 3.
236
Volokh supra note 20, at 1137 (suggesting such a balancing test, but cautioning that it "might be seen as an instruction that the judge in each free speech case
should simply think hard about both the value of the speech and the harm it causes,
and decide which feels more important to him.").
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See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)
("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."); see also
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (concluding that obscenity is
of "such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality").
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241
Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) ("[T]he First Amendment
permits a State to ban "true threats," which encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence ... [A] prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the
fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.").
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equally liable for its part in the conspiracy because the publication
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231
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definition of valuable. 233 In conclusion, speech may lose the constitutional protections of the First Amendment when the speech lacks value and aids directly in the facilitation of crime.
IV. BALANCING WIKILEAKS
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uses of WikiLeaks, against the invaluable nature of the unredacted
logs and the First Amendment harmful speech exceptions. Because
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B. Application of the Balancing
1. Public Concern v. Private Concern
WikiLeaks has already started to change the world by sparking an
international debate on secrecy and diplomacy. 242 However, the topic
of this note is not the overall public concern of WikiLeaks, but specifically the information relating to the unredacted names and addresses
of informants. The Supreme Court held that "not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance, and where matters of purely private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less
243
ri~orous. " This is because restricting speech that involves purely
pnvate matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as
limiting speech about matters of public interest. 244 Like Dun & Bradstreet, WikiLeaks is disseminating information that was solely the
concern of the individual interest of the speaker (one U.S. solider) and
his specific audience (U.S. Military Personnel). 245 Additionally, the
information is a private concern, because the content, form, and context of the information published by WikiLeaks were private details of
undercover informants in a war zone. 246
The final consideration for matters of public concern is the truth247
fulness of the speech. The WikiLeaks documents receive some ad242

IS WIKILEAKS A HIT MAN HANDBOOK?

[Vol. 3:2]

For example many experts have speculated that WikiLeak:s cables helped
spark the January 2011 uprising in Tunisia where President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali
was ousted after 23 years in power. The overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia
has spread to other protests around the Middle East, creating unrest in the entire region. citing Scott Shane, Cables from American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence
on Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A14 (quoting the cable, "Corruption in
Tunisia is getting worse ... although the petty corruption rankles, it is the excesses of
President Ben Ali's family that inspire outrage amount Tunisians ... with Tunisians
facing rising inflation and high unemployment, the conspicuous displays of wealth
and persistent rumors of corruption have added fuel to the fire.").
243
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
244
See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 ("[T]here is no threat to the free
and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful
dialogue of ideas.").
245
Dun & Bradstreet presents a similar situation because the report was sent
to only five subscribers from the reporting service, who were bound not to disseminate it further); see id at 749, 761 (evaluating whether the credit report was a matter
of public concern).
2 6
.
~ See id. at 761 (~xplaining that the evaluation of whether speech is ofpubhc or pnvate concern reqmres the court to examine the '"content, form, and context"'
of the speech, "as revealed by the whole record.").
247 er
. lei v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (evaluating the
0ee Bartmc
application of the First Amendment to the publication of truthful information of public concern).
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248
ditional legal protection due to their truthfulness. U.S. Government
officials have verified this fact by saying, "[i]n the history of WikiLeaks, nobody has claimed the material being put out is not authentic."249 In conclusion, the public concern doctrine gives broad First
Amendment protection to the overall WikiLeaks releases, but the unredacted names should be matters of private concern and therefore
more restricted.

2. WikiLeaks Is Both Valuable and Invaluable
First, WikiLeaks is valuable because it helps readers make political decisions on issues such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both
sets of War Logs are an encyclopedic depiction of the day-to-day ac250
The Afghan War
tivities of the U.S. military in these countries.
Logs add to the political discussion by showing that after nine years of
warfare the U.S. government and NATO forces have not tamed the
chaos in the country. 251 The Iraq War Logs contribute to the discourse
by cataloging just how many ordinary Iraqis had been killed since the
war efforts began. 252 These facts add important information to the ongoing debate about U.S. involvement in the Middle East.
Yet, there is debate on the value of this information to the general
understanding of the war efforts. On one hand, WikiLeaks argues that
public scrutiny of otherwise unaccountable and secretive institutions
253
forces them to consider the ethical implications of their actions.
Contrastingly, there is usually a reason to keep national security documents a secret. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton points out,
"[t]errorists have taken advantage of the openness of our societies to
carry out their plots .... As we work to advance freedoms, we must
also work against those who use communication networks as tools of
.
.
d .c. ,,254
d1sruptlon an i_ear.
248

ELSEA supra note 28, at 13 ("[P]ublication of truthful information that is
lawfully acquired enjoys considerable First Amendment protection.").
249 Ashley Fantz, New Massive Release to Put Iraq War and WikiLeaks in
Spotlight, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010)
http//edition.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq.documents/index.html?iref=mpst
oryview.
250
LEIGH, supra note 9, at 107.
251 Id at 127 (Moreover, that a war "fought ... for the hearts and minds of
Afghans cannot be won like this.").
252 Id. at 128 (The Iraq War Logs were "all about the numbers.").
253
WIKILEAKS.ORG, supra note 42.
254 Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, on Internet Freedom at the Newseum
in Washington (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
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officials have verified this fact by saying, "[i]n the history of WikiLeaks, nobody has claimed the material being put out is not authentic."249 In conclusion, the public concern doctrine gives broad First
Amendment protection to the overall WikiLeaks releases, but the unredacted names should be matters of private concern and therefore
more restricted.
2. WikiLeaks Is Both Valuable and Invaluable
First, WikiLeaks is valuable because it helps readers make political decisions on issues such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both
sets of War Logs are an encyclopedic depiction of the day-to-day ac250
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Se~ond, Wiki~eaks is valuable because it helps point out flaws in
o~r i:iat10nal ~ec~ty strategy. ~fter September 11, 2001, file sharing
within U.S. mtelhgence ~gencies boomed, presumably to increase
counter-terrorism efforts. Some commentators fear that this valuable intelligence gathering and sharing will suffer the most from the
WikiL ea.ks .saga. 256 However, others have expressed outrage that almost a rmlh~n people had access to these files, arguing that it was just
a matter of trme before someone like Bradley Manning released them
257
Overall, WikiLeaks has contributed to the debate on
to Assange.
how, what, when, and how much security information needs to be
classified.
Third, WikiLeaks helps outsiders investigate perceived govern258
Any WikiLeaks reader can fmd missteps of
ment misconduct.
American troops in both the Afghan and Iraq War Logs. For example,
the A~ghan War Logs provide details into. questionable battles betwee~ msurge~t for~es and the U.S. military259 and the Iraq War Logs
provide a detailed mcident-by-incident report of at least 66 081 violent deaths of civilians in Iraq since the invasion. 260 Additio~ally, the
Iraq. War L~gs seem to paint a disturbing picture of American troops
~g a bl":1d ey~ to ~he abuse of Iraqis by fellow Iraqis. 261 All of
this mformat10n will aid future investigations into government misconduct.
O~ the ~ther ~and, WikiLeaks discloses some highly sensitive informat10n, mcludmg the names of U.S. informants. This sort of in-

2

Kin
eremy
sman,. Troth and Consequence: the WikiLeaks Saga, POLICY
0PTIO~s ~(Feb. 2011) [heremafter Kinsman] (citing the co-chairman of the 9/11
<?omnnss10n, Le~ Hamilton who testified that "poor information sharing was the
smgle ~~atest failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.").
Eveny Morozov, WikiLeaks and the Perils ofExtreme Glasnost, NEW
PERSPE~5~NES QUARTERLY Vol. 28, Issue 1, 7 (Winter 2011).
Id; See also, Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World Growing
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, (July 19, 2010), available at
http:/'.projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-worldgrowmg-beyond-control/ (reporting that 8546,000 official had clearance for access to
top-secret materials.).
255

2 8

J

~ Ryan Singe!, Immune to Critics, Secret-Spilling Wikileaks Plans to Save
Journalzsts ... and the World, WIRED (July 3, 2008), available at
http://~.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2008/07/wikileaks?currentPage=all
(accordmg to Assange, WikiLeaks' goal is to create "a world where companies and
governme~t must keep the public, or their employees, or both, happy with their plans
and behav10r").
259
LEIGH, supra note 9 at 116-127.
260
Id. at 129.
261 S b.
T
.
a rma avermse & Andrew W. Lehren, Detainees Fared Worse in Iraqi
Hands, Logs Say, N.Y.TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2010, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23detainees.html.
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formation is especially helpful to terrorists b~cau~e co~ttin? an a.ct
of terrorism is considerably easier when detailed mformat10n is available. 262 For example, detailed information such as, '~here is ~ow ~ou
can make a silencer," is more helpful than general mformat10n, hke
263
"resist the temptation to brag about your crimes. " Therefore,. nonobvious information like "here is a list of U.S. infonnants," will be
more helpful to insurgents than obvious information like, "on _S~p
264
tember 4, 2008 U.S. forces were in Khandahar." In gen~ral, givmg
detailed information is more dangerous and can be destructive.

3. National Security Exception
Under Part IV, this note analyzed the national security exce~tion
and found that courts are willing to temper First Amendment nghts
when the government can prove that the information will "s.urely ~e
sult in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nat10n or its
people. " 265 While this is a very hi?h burden to prove, ,court~ have long
been extremely reluctant to quest10n the government s claims of con266
fidentiality in the name of national security. The attacks of Septem267
ber 11 have only reinforced this reluctance. After 9/11, the Supr~me
Court has held that terrorism or other special circumstances U:U.ght
warrant "heightened deference to the judgments of the political
. l
.ty ,,268
branches with respect to matters of natlona secun .
.
.
The death or disappearance of U.S. informants ~r sol~iers m. the
U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq result~ in.a drrect, Jgnnedrnte,
and irreparable damage to our national secunty mterests. Further262
263
264
265

Volokh, supra note 20 at 1213.
Id
Hypothetical information not found in WikiLeaks cables.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (empha-

sis added).

.
See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (198~) (notmg that .
"courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authonty of the Executive
.
in military and national security affairs").
267 Kovarovic, supra note 135, at 2022. See also, N. Jersey Media, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that."in the wake of s.eptember 11, 2001, a day on which American life changed drastically and dramatically .
.. the primary national policy must be self-preservation.").
266

268

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).

Iraq War Logs: The Defense Department's Response, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 22,
2010 at A9, available at
.
.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010110/23/world/middleeast/23detamees.html (quotmg the
Department of Defense stating that WikiLeaks has:
"[E]xpose[d] secret information that could make our troops even more vulnerable ~o
attack in the future. Just as with the leaked Afghan documents, we know ?ur enemies
will mine this information, looking for insights into how we operate, cultivate sources
269
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more, the national security exception should protect the loss of life as
well as the loss of valuable information that will lead to prodemocracy movements and a steady end to the war efforts. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton asserted that the leaks "put people's lives in
danger, threatens our national security, and undermines [U.S.] efforts
to work with other countries to solve shared problems" 270 Indeed,
counterterrorism communications need special protection in order to
maintain the integrity of the information received. 271
Furthermore, WikiLeaks is not the Pentagon Papers case. The
Pentagon Papers case was seen as a victory for the New York Times
because it took extraordinary steps to diminish the harm of the release
and the government dramatically overstated the risk of information
disclosure. 272 The WikiLeaks case is very different because the U.S.
does not have the jurisdiction to remove the documents from the web
site, nor does it have the power to enforce an injunction. 273 The main
distinction, however, is that the New York Times carefully followed a
set of ethical precepts derived both from journalistic norms and underlying American values. 274 In contrast, WikiLeaks does not discuss its
model for redaction, nor does it seem to have a consistent redaction
protocol. 275 This is particularly worrisome for future releases because
the decision to publish is made with limited outside input and with a
potentially significant impact. 276
WikiLeaks supporters could counter the attacks on its professional
ethics by pointing to the lack of impact the information has had on
national security interests. Indeed, the Pentagon has acknowledged
that they do not know of anyone in Afghanistan harmed due to the
releases. 277 Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has estimated that the "consequences" for U.S. foreign policy are "fairly
modest." 278 However, this does not mean that there are not future risks
as the Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to study Wikand react in combat situations, even the capability of our equipment. This security
breach could very well get our troops and those they are :fighting with killed.").
270
Kinsman, supra note 255, at 1.
271
Id. at 2.
272
Bambauer, supra note 63, at 10.
273
Id. at 3. See also Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d
980 (2008).
274
Bambauer, supra note 63, at 4.
275
Id. at 8.
276
Id. at 10.
277
Ashley Fantz, New Massive Release to Put Iraq War and WikiLeaks in
Spotlight, CNN, Oct. 22, 2010, available at
http//edition.cnn.com/201O/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq .documents/index.html?iref-=mpst
oryview.
278
Kinsman, supra note 255, at 2.
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iLeaks. Additionally, Snepp broadened the national security exception
to allow courts to find liability without substantial evidence of a na279
tional security risk. Therefore, the fact that no deaths have yet occurred does not mean that WikiLeaks cannot face future prosecution
or that the unredacted logs are not potentially harmful.

4. True Threats
280

If indicted on civil or criminal charges, 281 WikiLeaks could not
use First Amendment immunity as a defense because the speech is
unprotected under the doctrine of true threats. A Taliban spokesperson
claims the Taliban has formed a "nine-member commission" to mine
WikiLeaks and find "people who are spying. " 282 This should come as
no shock to WikiLeaks founders. Reporters from the Guardian and
the New York Times both expressed concerns about the lack of redactions in the Afghan War Logs. 283 As Guardian reporter David Leigh
stated, it was clearly possible to work out identities of informants
"with the help of some local knowledge and to publish the log might
lead to the Taliban executing [mentioned] Afghans." 284 However,
when Leigh asked Assange about publishing the informant names, his
response was, "Well, they're informants, so, if they get killed, they've
got it coming to them. They deserve it. " 285 Assange' s callousness was
noted by Bill Keller, the Executive Editor of the New York Times,
who refused to link directly to the WikiLeaks cable dump from their
286
own website. Keller stated, "We feared, rightly, as it turned out that their trove would contain the names of low-level informants and
make them Taliban targets." 287
WikiLeaks' massive release of classified information and unfiltered military reports from Iraq and Afghanistan placed the lives of
U.S. allies and pro-democracy forces at risk by giving terrorist groups

279
280
281

CHEMERINSKY' supra note 31, at 961.
28 U.S.C. § 1350, Alien Tort Claims Act, see supra note 39.
50 U.S.C. § 421-426, Intelligence Identities Protection Act, see supra note

39.
282

Bums & Somaiya supra note 11.
LEIGH, supra note 9, at 111 and 114.
284
See id. at 111 (quoting David Leigh was "worried about the repercussions
of publishing these names, who could easily be killed by the Taliban or other militant
groups if identified.").
285 Id.
283

286

Id. at 114 (additionally, the New York Times feared "that readers- and
indeed their own hostile US government - would not see the paper's staff as detached
reporters if they directed readers to WikiLeaks").
281 Id.
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a "hit list. " 288 There is a true threat to the lives of these Afghan informants, and the U.S. soldiers protecting them, because of the Taliban's indiscriminate use of force, and the group's harsh treatment of
prisoners. 289 According to UN statistics, the Taliban is now blamed
for more than three-fourths of all civilian casualties, and those casualties increased by 20 percent last year. wo Taliban brutality is likely to
increase as NATO forces escalate attacks on Taliban strongholds in
order to weaken the insurgent groups before the planned end-date of
291
combat operations in 2014.
Increased Taliban violence proves there is a true threat to the unredacted persons. In R.A. V., the Court emphasized that true threats go
against the purpose of First Amendment protection, which is meant to
292
shield individuals from the fear of violence. Additionally, the true
threats doctrine was designed to protect potential victims from the
reasonable apprehension of fear of violence, as well as the actual violence. 293 In the case of WikiLeaks, those mentioned in the Afghan and
Iraq War Logs have a reasonable fear of violence, justified by over a
decade of brutal acts conducted by the Taliban.
Indeed, the WikiLeaks releases parallel the true threats in the Nuremberg Files. 294 Both publications gave names and addresses of potential victims to potential killers. 295 In Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Williamette, the standard for a true threat is when a reasonable person would foresee the statement as a serious expression of
intent to harm or assault, considered in light of their entire factual

288

STERNER supra note 73, at 1.
RUBIN supra note 13 (quoting "Taliban are very harsh to those who have
been convicted of spying and those who have an affiliation with the government and
the foreigners,' said one elder, Hajji Maitiullah Khan. 'People convicted of such
crimes can be beaten up severely.' One man, he said, was given 500 lashes a day for
several days.").
290 Rod Nordland, Afghan Rights Groups Shift Focus to Taliban, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/world/asia/lOafghanistan.html
(stating, "[Insurgent] attacks caused more than 1,800 civilian deaths from January to
October 2010. By comparison, NATO forces are blamed for up to 508 civilian deaths
last year.").
291 Erin Cuningham, Robert Gates Says U.S. Should Maintain Afghanistan
Presence After 2014, THE NATIONAL, (Mar. 8, 2011)
http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/robert-gates-says-us-shouldmaintain-afghanistan-presence-after-2014.
292
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
293
Weiss supra note 30, at 1313.
294 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
295 Id. at 1188 (the Nuremberg Files contain personal identifying information
of the Plaintiffs).
289
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296

context. In the Second Circuit, WikiLeaks would also not be granted immunity under the First Amendment because a reasonable listener
is allowed to present contextual evidence to clarify whether ambigu.
d a true threat. 297 Therefore, any charges
ous 1anguage constitute
brought against WikiLeaks would need to be examined under the First
Amendment.
Another similarity between WikiLeaks and the Nuremberg Files
is that third parties, and not the hit men themselves, published both
the names and addresses of targets. 298 The Ninth Circuit held, in the
case of the Nuremberg Files, that the Plaintiffs had an actionable
299
claim of a true threat. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the
lack of expressly threatening language is not necessary as long as the
speech can be considered a true threat "in light of their entire factual
context." 300 Therefore, the Courts should consider the situation surrounding the released names and addresses in context of the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the brutal nature of the Taliban and Iraqi
insurgent forces.
5. Crime-Facilitating Speech
When WikiLeaks released the Afghan and Iraq War Logs, it unintentionally conveyed information to insurgent groups that made it
easier for them to commit acts of war against U.S. military forces and
informants. This fits the stated definition for crime-facilitating
301
speech. While the doctrine of crime-facilitating speech has not been
addressed directly by the Supreme Court, 302 it is easy to make a comparison between WikiLeaks and examples of crime-facilitation cases.
First, many of the crime-facilitation cases fall under the national security and true threats exception. 303 Second, WikiLeaks parallels the Hit
296
297
298

Id. at 1194.
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia!Williamette, 23 F. Supp. 2d at

1188.
299

Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1194 (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F .3d 367,
372 (9th Cir. 1996)).
301
See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1103.
302 Id.
303 F
. except10n
. cases, see Umted
·
or th e nat.1ona1 secunty
States v. Progressive,
Inc, 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979) (where a publisher released information on how to build
a hydrogen bomb); and Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (where a former
CIA agent wished to publish details relating to his work with the CIA). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 12. For the true threats exception cases, see Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists 23 F
Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). See also Volokh, supra note 20, at 1099.
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Man case in that it offers valuable information for people who are
already seeking to commit certain crimes. 304 When publication of a
document makes it easier for criminals to commit crimes the law
needs to question the broad right of publication. Finally, this note is
suggesting that courts take a balanced and tempered approach to a
specific situation in order to avoid setting an unexpected or unwelcomed precedent. 305
V. CONCLUSION
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tice system can do is remove the shield of the First Amendment, as
was done in the Hit Man case. 313 Removing this shield will only subject WikiLeaks to presenting evidence on the First Amendment issue
and it is unlikely to be a severe intrusion on the organization's constitutional rights. Furthermore, adopting the argument that WikiLeaks
does not deserve First Amendment immunity will deter other similar
organizations from also publishing harmful information. 314 Overall, in
considering the risk to national security and the broad true threats
doctrine, the U.S. courts should view WikiLeaks as the next Hit Man
Handbook, a detailed manual on how to find Rachel Redacted.

In conclusion, WikiLeaks has, intentionally or not, put lives at
risk and damaged U.S. national security interests. 306 Simply put, the
harms outweigh the benefits. When courts balance the public concern
307
doctrine, which is considered the highest rung of protected speech,
against government's need to protect individuals from national security risks, 308 true threats of violence, 309 and the over-arching problem
associated with crime-facilitating speech, 310 the harms to society are
greater than the benefits of disclosure. While one of these three exceptions would probably not be enough to defeat First Amendment immunity311 on its own, the three concerns combined should be sufficient to allow a plaintiff in a case against WikiLeaks to present evidence linking the organization to the crimes committed, thereby defeating its First Amendment immunity.
Any attempts to suppress WikiLeaks' speech would be highly imperfect, especially in the Internet age. 312 Therefore, the most our jus304

See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1107 (quoting, "to commit a typical crime, a
criminal generally needs to have three things: (1) the desire to commit the crime, (2)
the knowledge and ability to do so, and (3)(a) the belief that the risk of being caught
is low enough to make the benefits exceed the costs, (b) the willingness- often born
of rage or felt ideological imperative- to act without regard to the risk, or ( c) a careless disregard for the risk." Insurgent groups generally possess all of the required
elements above.).
305
See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1219 (Crime-facilitating speech problems
"ought to be resolved with an eye towards the broader issue. Otherwise, a solution
that may seem appealing in one situation-for instance, concluding that the Hit Man
murder manual should be punishable because all recklessly or knowingly crimefacilitat#1g speech is unprotected-may set an unexpected and unwelcome precedent
for other situations.").
306
Sterner, supra note 34, at 1.
307
Snyderv. Phelps 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
308
309

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
See generally Volokh supra note 20, at 1057.
311
See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
312
Volokh supra note 20, at 1108. See also Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (2008) (where the District Court noted the impossi310

bility of taking disclosed information offWikiLeaks and its mirror cites stating, "The
cat is out of the bag and the issuance of an injunction would therefore be ineffective
to protect the professed privacy rights of the bank's clients."); Mark Del Franco,
Paladin Kills OffPart ofIts Product Line, CATALOG AGE, Apr. 1, 2000, 14 (while
civil lawsuit led publisher to stop distributing the Hit Man Handbook, versions are
still available for free on the internet.).
313
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997).
314
Strener, supra note 73, at 1 ("Wikileaks represents a growing trend that
will undermine the long-term utility of the Internet for commerce and governance.").
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COMMENTS
THE PARABLE OF THE NONPLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE
TREE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE
OF NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES
By Mitch Kline
INTRODUCTION

Non-practicing entities (''NPEs"), pejoratively referred to as "patent trolls," are controversial. 1 A "patent troll" is commonly defined
as an entity that licenses and enforces patents, but does not produce
any goods. 2 Critics accuse these entities of filing frivolous suits for
infringement of weak patents, while contributing no social benefit
through innovation or commercialization of their technologies. 3

1

See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, PATENTLY-0 (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:39
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-patent-troll-myths.html
("Few players in the patent system (maybe none) are more hated than patent trolls.").
2
See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1810 (2007) (Patent trolls are
"firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture
technology"); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (''NPEs are
firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing
fees.").
3
See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 52 (2003) (testimony of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel oflntel Corporation) (noting that patent trolls purchase "improvidently granted patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses"); Shrestha,
supra note 2, at 119 ("One of the most prominent criticisms against NPEs is that they
acquire weak and obscure patents and use them to pursue 'baseless' litigation.").
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